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Political Factors Contributing 
to the Generation of Refugees 
- 
in the Horn of Africa 
by Peter Woodward 
The exposue by the mass media of the 
conditions of refugees in eastern Sudan and of 
camps of displaced people in northern Ethiopia 
in October 1984 first alerted the world at large 
to the extent of the famine in that area But 
clearly the problem is mom complex than most 
people then rdized, for in the Horn refugees. 
famine and politics an inexhicably linked. 
Northeast Africa has the biggest concentration 
of refugees in the world The largest single 
group are those from Eritrea and Tigre living in 
eastem Sudan. followed by the people of Haud 
and Ogaden regions of Ethiopia who have 
sought refuge in Somalia and Qlbuti. In 
Ethiopia there are also opponents of Somalia's 
government and refugees from the southean 
Sudan. In addition there are Ethiopian refugees 
in Kenya, Ugandan refugees in the southern 
Sudan, and refugees from Chad in western 
Sudan. The one generalization that can be 
made L that they are all escaping from 
conditions in which political conflict is as 
1 
significant as environmental degradation and 
famine. 
It would be the contention of most host 
governments that refugees originate in the 
peripheries of the states involved. But the 
refugees themselves see their relationships to 
the states from which they have fled as far more 
complex. For example, people from the Haud 
and Ogaden regions of Ethiopia, who regard 
themselves as Somalis. would like to see the 
boundary of Somalia redrawn in such a way as 
to incorporate them in that country, a view 
which is encouraged by Somalia and which 
conm%uted to the Somali attack on Ethiopia in 
1977. The Eritrems. on the other hand, are 
less concerned with boundary changes than with 
their claim for an independent state of Erieea, 
while the Tigrean movement seeks greater 
regional autonomy within a reformed Ethiopia 
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Tension in the region may in part be blamed on 
the arbitrary borders bequeathed by colonialism. 
especially in the case of Somalia, but often the 
opposition movements do not regard 
inappropriate borders as the heart of their 
problems. For them the origins lie more in the 
discrimination which peoples of regions have 
suffered at the hands of their government. Yet 
their suffering is not only the result of 
developments in their own country, but also 
must be seen in the wider international setting. 
For instance, the strategic importance of the 
Horn to the Middle East has meant that both 
Middle Eastern states and the superpowers have 
become involved. All too often outside powers 
have exacerbated tension by supporting 
guerrilla movements or one government against 
another. 
There are numerous examples of the 
international exploitation of peripheral groups 
in the Horn Libya's "radical" activities have 
included support for the Sudan People's 
Liberation Anny, as a result of Resident 
Qaddafh opposition to ex-Resident Numeiri, 
while the southern Sudanese have also been 
assisted by Israel as part of its anti-Arab 
activities. In turn, a number of Arab states 
have aided the Eritrean Liberation Front, the 
fvst guerrilla movement in northan Ethiopia. 
The superpowers have also provided military 
aid to a number of govmunents in the region. 
enabling than to meet opposition with force. 
panicularly in Ethiopia 
Leaving broader international rivalries aside for 
the moment, relations between neighbowing 
states are central to the problems which have 
generated refugees in the Horn. 
For the most part, African states have accepted 
their postcolonial boundaries, though this has 
not been the case in the Hom, especially with 
Somalia. The popular territorial ambitions of 
the Somali people in general. including those 
living in areas of northern Kenya, and the areas 
of Haud and Ogaden in Ethiopia, increased 
tension throughout the region and contributed 
to the attack upon Ethiopia in 1977-78. 
Ethiopia repulsed the invasion. but not before a 
large number of refugees fled to Somalia. 
Somalia's active plrsuit of boundary changes is 
relatively unusual. though Idi Arnin made 
highly imaginative claims to his neighbow' 
territories, and it war an incursion by his 
troops into northern Tanzania that provided the 
carus belli for the Tanzanian-led invasion of 
Uganda which brought about his downfall. 
Also. the Sudan-Ethiopia border has been in 
dispute on a number of occasions during the 
past twenty years, and at present, with refugees 
of both countries on either side, it is once again 
a source of tension beween the two countries. 
The presence of refugees creates serious 
tensions within recipient countries. Econo- 
mically, the management of refugees is likely 
to be far beyond the capacity of the host 
community, especially since border areas are. 
for reasons of domestic economy, often 
amongst the least-developed areas. The United 
Nations High Commission for Refugees 
(UNHCR) and a numba of other agencies have 
given large amounts of aid to refugees, but this 
may only exacerbate local tekion. For 
instance, the short-term aid provided for 
refugees may not be available-to the local 
population who may, as in eastem Sudan in 
1984-85. be in similarly desperate circum- 
stances. Likewise. longer-term refugee aid may 
include resettlement. and this will impinge on 
local economic resources. The economic 
distortion that huge refugee communities can 
produce has been particularly obvious in recent 
years in Somalia; and recently in eastern Sudan. 
there have been several incidents of tension 
resulting from competition for scarce services, 
especially in such fields as education and health 
Care. 
Politically. too, the presence of refugees can 
generate a range of mexpected problems. Even 
if refugees accept their new status and resettle, 
they are likely to affect local, regional and even 
national political developments, as has become 
particularly evident in Somalia Similarly, 
following the downfall of Amin in 1979. 
refugees from Uganda have had an impact on 
Equatorial politics in the Sudan. 
Further, refugees usually feel involved in the 
political issues that gave rise to their exile, and 
this often leads to their support of guerrilla 
movements. Many men from the Western 
Somali Liberation Front, for instance, left their 
families in camps in Somalia and returned to 
the struggle in the Haud and Ogaden. even after 
the Somali defeat in 1978. Similarly. Ethiopia 
has ikequentiy alleged that the refugee camps in 
eastern Sudan harbour its enemies from Eritrea, 
Tigre and Wollo. 
It is a short step from these allegations to 
accusations that neighbowing states are 
condoning and perhaps even encouraging 
subversive activities. Ethiopia has accused not 
only Somalia and the Sudan but also a number 
of other Arab states. Similarly. the Sudan and 
Somalia have made counter-accusations about 
guerrilla movements in southern Sudan and 
northem Somalia 
In northeast A£iica in general there have indeed 
been a number of interventions in the affairs of 
neighbouring states. sometimes connected with 
refugees. Tanzania's army backed the Ugandan 
refugees returning home after the overthrow of 
Amin, Libya. the Sudan and Egypt have all 
backed factions in Chad, some of which had 
sought refuge in their territory; and the Sudan 
condoned and sometimes encouraged guerrilla 
forces in northern Ethiopia. In turn. Ethiopia 
(and Libya) backed the Sudan People's 
Liberation Amy in southern Sudan, some of 
whose members had fled there from 1983 
onwards. But of course the most aggressive 
external attack was that launched by Somalia 
against Ethiopia in 1977, allegedly in support 
of the Western Somalis h m  the Ogaden who 
had taken refuge in Somalia 
Intervention need not always be aggressive; one 
country may become involved with another in 
order to prop up a regime with which it has 
friendly ties. 
Still, such defensive interventions may do as 
much to encourage conflicts, which contribute 
to the generation of refugees. as more offensive 
intervention. This is particularly the case when 
the intervention gives the supported 
government, as in the Sudan, the confidence as 
well as the financial and military ability to 
repress marginalized groups, in that case, the 
southern Sudanese in the early 1980s. 
While relations between neighbouring states are 
a significant factor in the conditions that have 
generated refugees in northeast Afiica. thue are 
two further political factors of consequence: 
regional politics and superpower rivalry. 
Historically there has been rivalry and tension 
between Christianity and Islam in the Horn. 
with Ethiopia traditionally regarded as a bastion 
of anti-Islamic power. More recently. Middle 
East conflicts have had an impact on the area, 
with Israel first actively supporting Haile 
Selassie, and subsequently the Marxist regime 
against their common Arab enemy. Arab 
involvement in the Horn came fist through the 
rival revolutionary activities of the Syrians and 
Iraqis, who at various times have given 
financial and military expression to their 
solidarity with the Eritreans. 
Although Arab and Israeli involvement has 
become a factor in the Horn, it is not decisive. 
The Eritreans in particular are not overly 
dependent on their Arab supporters, nor are the 
Israelis the major backers of Ethiopia Instead. 
superpower rivalry is the most significant 
factor in the polarization of political relations 
in the Horn. 
The growing US and Soviet involvement has 
contributed most to the polarization of the 
region and led to the initial international 
response to the 1984-85 famine, notably to the 
criticism cast on the Ethiopian, Soviet-backed 
leadership. Still. it would be too easy to W 
that their presence makes superpowers the 
dominant forces in the area. This is not the 
case, for none of the leaders in the Horn is a 
puppet of the superpowers. In addition, neither 
Washington nor Moscow has been able to 
determine domestic policy in the region 
The political bases of refugee-generating 
conflicts are thus varied and complex and 
involve overlapping interests between domestic 
forces, neighbouring states, Middle Eastern 
states and the superpowers. Each of these 
political forces has a degree of autonomy and a 
degree of dependence: while they influence each 
other, none has the absolute power simply to 
dictate to others. Knowledgeable observers of 
these various conflicts frequently conclude thal 
given the improbability of achieving military 
solutions, and the prospect of the continuation 
or even the worsening of the situation, some 
attempt to bring international pressure to bear 
to encourage negotiation would be highly 
desirable. Yet it follows from the above 
remarks that any dialogue would need to be 
between individual states and their internal 
opponents and could not be dictated from the 
outside. Until such time as permanen1 
solutions are found, it is the people of the Horr 
who will suffer. Irrespective of the rains anc 
craps, the refugee crisis will continue. 
News Digest 
The next volume of Refuge will start with a 
Special Issue partly devoted to Bill C-55 on 
amendments to the Immigration Act. Articles 
and commentaries in the Forum section will 
discuss the implications of the proposals. 
There will also be a comprehensive section on 
the refugee and asylum situation in the United 
States. Publication is anticipated for August/ 
September 1987. 
The Working Group for Refugee Women. 
Canadian Council for Refugees. is conducting a 
literature review of studies on Refugee Women. 
Many studies are difficult to locate bccause they 
are subsumed under larger research documents. 
If you have written a report or prepared a 
bibliography, please call or write to Noreen 
Nimmons at the Refugee Documentation 
Project, York University, 4700 Keele Stree~ 
North York, Ontario, Canada M3J 1P3, or 
telephone (416) 736-5061, extension 3639. 
The editor and staff of Refuge would be 
pleased to consider articles for possible 
kclusion in future editions. ~r t ic les  hould 
focus on refugee issues and situations, 
including government policy and social action, 
and be properly documented ' in standard 
scholarly format and presentation. Please mail 
your submission to the Managing Editor of 
Refuge (c/o Refugee Documentation Projec~ 
York University, 4700 Keele Street, North 
York, Ontario, Canada M3J 1P3) and enclose a 
brief precis of the article. 
New Publications 
David Matas. Canadian Immigration Law 
(Ottawa, Canadian Bar Association. 1987). 
Matas stresses that "it is more important 
to refugee claimants than to anyone else 
that they know the law". 
Review '86: Outlook '87 (Ottawa: N o h  
South Institute, 1987). This annual 
review focuses on foreign policy, human 
rights. and Canada's o m  foreign policy 
with respect to international challenges. 
World Refugee Survey: 1986 In Review 
(Washington: US Committee for 
Refugees, 1987). Carries an excellent 
collection of statistics on refugees and 
internally displaced peoples and "cameos" 
of refugee-producing countries. 
Eritrean Refugees 
by Mary Dines 
The ex-Italian colony of Eritrea was 
established as an autonomous state by the 
United Nations after the Second World 
War and, although Ethiopia wanted to 
annex it, a federation of the two states was 
created in 1952. From that time onward 
Eritrea's autonomy was under attack and 
on November 14, 1962 its federal status 
was abolished. It was the failure of the 
UN to take action then that has led to the 
twenty-five year war between Eritreans and 
Ethiopians. And it is this war that has 
been responsible for the most serious 
refugee situation in the Sudan. It has also 
been a major cause of the Ethiopian 
famine of 1983-84, and in spite of 
reasonable rains since. Erirrea is likely to 
remain acutely short of food. 
There are about a ha'f-million Eritrean 
refugees in the Sudan alone. About one- 
fifth are congregated in refugee camps run 
by the UNHCR in the eastern Sudan and 
the rest are mainly unregistered refugees 
living in Khartoum. Port Sudan, Gedaref 
and other towns in the north. There are at 
least another hundred thousand Eritreans in 
the Middle East, Europe and North 
America. 
Refugees are a barometer of the war in 
Eritrea Although there is a continuous 
flow of families and individuals into the 
Sudan from Eritrean towns under 
Ethiopian occupation, the major exoduses 
have coincided with Ethiopian attacks on 
civilian areas. During the Haile Selassie 
era there were major flights in 1967 and 
1970, and, since the military coup, the 
war has escalated into a major conflict, 
with massive movements of refugees in 
1975, 1979 and 1982. In 1984-85 eighty 
thousand Eriueans fled to the Sudan. It 
has become common practice to refer to 
this p u p  as "drought victims", but this 
is an oversimplif~ation. Eritrea has been 
subjected to periodic droughts for many 
years; since the early 1970s the rains have 
been erratic in many areas. In spite of 
this, had peace prevailed it would have 
been possible for Eritreans to make 
provision for bad years by developing the 
considerable agricultural potential of the 
country. 
Within Eriuea there is widespread 
displacement of the population. Since the 
late 1970s people living in villages near 
towns garrisoned by Ethiopian mops or 
along the main roads linking Ethiopian 
army bases have had to flee from the 
major towns following the arrest or 
killing of individual family members. 
The effects of war have been particularly 
harsh for the pastoralists. Traditional 
grazing land has been subjected to 
bombardment and nomadic caravans have 
been attacked. In some rural areas, whole 
settlements have been burnt to the ground. 
The threat of air attacks has prevented 
small farmers, who eke out only a 
marginal existence, from ploughing. 
planting and harvesting. 
The impoverishment of the civilian 
population by the war has been greatly 
exacerbated by periods of low rainfall that 
have affected all parts of Eritrea, 
culminating in the most recent, almost 
total drought. In many areas, water 
sources completely dried up and thousands 
of animals died. Whole communities were 
forced to leave their homes in search of 
food. Many found their way to the refugee 
camps in the Sudan. 
A s w e y  carried out in 1979 showed that 
virtually all of the refugees would return 
to Eritrea if that were possible. They 
would clearly be better off if they were 
able to retum to their home areas and get 
on with the business of developing their 
land and improving their standard of 
living. In addition, their return would lift 
a burden from the Sudanese government. 
The Erivean Relief Association (ERA), an 
indigineous group founded in 1976 and 
working in co-operation wilh the Eriuean 
Peoples' Ll'beration Front (EPLF), has 
already prepared a repatriation programme 
based on settling returnees in agricultural 
areas where they will have access to land, 
tools, seeds and training. 
Already the ERA has tried to enable 
displaced persons to stay in their home 
areas rather than be forced to seek asylum 
in the Sudan. Their first camp for 
displaced civilians, Solomuna, was set up 
in 1977; at the same time, a boarding 
school, Zero, for unaccompanied children 
was established. Both have been forced by 
bombing to change locations on a number 
of occasions, yet both have developed into 
integrated communities. Further. schools 
and camps have since been established by 
the ERA, attempting to create new 
communities rather than places in which 
people can be parked until the situation 
improves. Success requires careful 
selection of sites with a continuous 
supply of water. Many of the camps have 
agricultural facilities, and since Eritrea has 
a high proportion of qualified doctors, 
scientists and mechanics in the "liberated 
areas", these people have organized 
training programmes in order to pass on 
essential skills. For instance, mechanics 
have been trained to repair and maintain 
the ERA'S fleet of trucks which transport 
food and other necessary goods to the 
displaced population. 
On a number of occasions representatives 
of the Ethiopian government and the 
Eritrean people have met to discuss ways 
to end the fighting. So far, these 
meetings have been unsuccessful. Now 
what is needed is an initiative from an 
independent third party who can foster 
negotiations between the government and 
the EPLF. Until such time, Eritreans will 
continue to flow into the Sudan and the 
Eritreans' hope to make the "liberated 
areas" into economically viable regions 
will be doomed to failure. 
The Plight of the Oromo Refugees in the Horn of Africa 
The History of the Oromo people of Ethiopia 
is one of colonization, subjugation and 
decimation. In fact, the first refugees on record 
in the Horn were Oromos who left their 
homeland during the early period of Ethiopian 
occupation. Annexation by Ethiopia meant the 
loss of their main source of livelihood, the 
land, and the denial of the most basic human 
and national rights. The situation prompted 
frequent armed uprisings, which have become 
more organized in recent years. Conflic~ 
political persecution, and the inept and 
destructive policies of the Ethiopian 
government have now displaced hundreds of 
thousands of Oromos. These people live either 
in the safe area within the Oromos' region. 
occupied by the Oromo Liberation Front 
(OLF), or in the neighbouring states of 
Somalia, Djibouti, Kenya, the Sudan and 
beyond. 
The major cause of displacement is the scorched- 
earth policy of the Ethiopian government, 
aimed at suppressing the Oromo people and 
taking control of the land wherever opposition 
is suspected. Though this policy has led to 
Oromo uprisings, which have been cruelly put 
down, it has been more evident since 1976 
when the Oromo liberation struggle resumed. 
The policy includes the confiscation of property 
of both individuals and communities suspected 
of acts of sympathy or support for the Oromo 
liberation forces. Villages and crops are burnt, 
women and girls are raped, livestock and people 
are machine-gunned. Between mid-1984 and 
1985 alone, measures taken by the Ethiopians 
in the Hrarghe drove more than 100,000 
Orornos out of the region and to the safety of 
the Somali Democratic Republic. Many others 
remained inside the counv. in the areas under 
the contml of the OLF. 
Fear of persecution is another major cause of 
displacement. Indeed, Ethiopia has become 
notorious for imprisoning without trial 
suspected supporters of the nationalist 
movements or opponents of government 
policies. In Ethiopia, where prisons are as 
numerous as schools and clinics, cases of 
torture, executions anddisappearances have been 
welidocumented. 
Another cause of the Oromo exodus is 
conscription. In recent years, the government 
has introduced the draft for men beween the 
ages of eighteen and thirty. After a short period 
by Taha Abdi 
of training, they are sent to fight their own 
people or taken to other parts of the country to 
fight against other resistance movements. 
Many avoid conscription and possibly death by 
fleeing the country. 
The forceful evacuation of Oromos from their 
traditional homeland to "protected hamlets" is 
deeply resented by the peasantry and is another 
cause of their flight. Forced resettlement of 
Oromos is motivated by the government's 
desire to separate the people from the Oromo 
liberation forces. Similarly, their forced 
collectivization and cultural harassment (by 
such programmes as the literacy campaign in 
which people are forced to learn Amharic), 
increase resentment and encourage people to 
leave. 
Last but not least among the causes of 
displacement is the resettlement of the Tigre 
from the north. Moving northerners into the 
Oromo homeland and employing them as an 
arm of state security is a policy begun by 
Emperor Meneli, but institutionalized and 
extended by Haile Selassie. The current 
government hoped to move at least 1.5 million 
people from the same area under the pretext of 
drought-created famine. In an attempt to 
finance the project through international relief 
funds, the Settlement Authority merged with 
the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission in 
1980. One of the reasons that the govemment 
allowed the recent famine to reach catastrophic 
proportions was its desire to create large 
numbers of helpless participants for the 
resettlement scheme as well as to attract 
additional funding. But, try as it might, the 
government has not been able to reach its 
resettlement target, mainly because of the 
paucity of voluntary recruits. Many of those 
who have been resettled were, in fact, abducted 
from their home areas. The project has proved 
to be an economic and social disaster, and most 
settlers continue to rely on food assistance for 
years after bcing resealed. 
The resettlement of outsiders into Oromo 
country has been implemented in the face of 
strong objections by the Oromos and, more 
recently, by those Wing resettled. Almost 
without exception. this settlement has 
worsened the plight of the indigenous 
population. In all cases the best land has been 
allocated to the new settlers and the Oromos are 
pushed to less productive areas. 
The political motive behind the resettlement 
scheme -- namely. to denude the north of 
Ethiopia, particularly Tigre, of people from 
dissident areas -- is clear. The facts that 
thousands of children have been orphaned partly 
as a result of the forced movement, and that 
thousands have died in the same process have 
been documented. 
The end result is that there are at least 800.00 
Ethiopian refugees in Somalia, about half of 
whom are Oromos. While these people face 
problems of status &termination. the Somali 
govemment has been exemplary in maintaining 
an open-border policy toward displaced Oromos 
and others. and no refugee has been renuned 
against hisher will by the Somali government. 
But neither has this govemment facilitated any 
voluntary repatriation. Kenya was once a 
sanctuary for the Oromo, but they are no longer 
welcome there. Many who settled there earlier 
have since left and found asylum in the Sudan. 
walking through Uganda, or in central Africa. 
In fact, there are several thousand Oromos in 
the Blue Nile province of the Sudan, where 
their communities have obtained some degree 
of self-sufficiency. 
Djibouti once assisted the Oromos, but in 
1984. (and again in 1986-87) with the 
implementation of the Tripartite agreement 
between Ethiopia. Djibouti and the UNHCR. 
people were returned, in some cases forcibly, to 
Ethiopia. 
Others who faced forced repatriation went on to 
Somalia. while still others took fishing boats 
and headed for Saudi Arabia and North Yemen, 
with varying degrees of success. 
Endemic conflict, famine and large-scalc 
displacement in the Horn are the colonial 
legacy of Ethiopia and a direct consequence of 
the violence and destructive policies pursued by 
the Amhara ruling classes. The international 
donor community. which provides relief 
assistance to care for the victims of Ethiopian 
atrocities and incompetence, has a strong moral 
duty to bring pressure to bear on the Ethiopian 
govemment to seek a political solution which 
takes into account the representatives of thc 
Oromos. the OLF. Until such time as a 
peaceful, honourable and enduring solution is 
found, Oromos will continue to fill the refugee 
camps of the Horn. 
Report on the Djibouti Refugee Situation 
Background 
In 1982-83 u a result of a tripartite agreement 
krwccn the governments of Djibouti and Ethiopia 
and the UNHCR. the implementation of a 
repatriation programme was begun. The voluntsy 
nature of this reptriation was widely questioned. 
(See Jeff Crisp's "Valmtary Repavktion 
Rognmmer for African Refugees: A Critical 
Examination", Refugee I w ,  V d  1, No. 2) 
Effor~ to p w u r e  refugees to luve  the cany 
began again when on July 29. 1986 refugees in 
Djibouti were issued a circular informing than that 
thcy had "no fu~ure in a refugee camp nor on 
Djiboutian d" It continued by observing thnt 
". . . the ma&& of you left your country for 
re- which have ceased to a i s t  today ud therefore 
you should no mac be considered u refugees." 
Refugees were rrminded that chc Miopitn 
gwemment had promulgated an amnesty law in 
favour of all  rrprtliants in 1983. 
Refugees wcm furrhcr informed that if anyom did not 
"rccep to rrpuriate volunurily", he mua "request 
individually tbc continuation of his refugee status". 
ldartifiution cads previourly issued wen declaredm 
longer valid, and new onu would be issued to those 
who d u r e l y  d u d  to repetriate and who prscd 
the re-screening exercise. The circular informed the 
refugees that r special canmiuea h s d b  established 
to examine thore requests and which would "take 
dcciiions rapidly which would not be. subject to 
a@. Those who puscd the re-screwring would be 
moved to a new refugee camp in the regian of Obodc, 
a region in which it would not only be impossible 
for refugees to cultivue land but w h m  they would 
also be. cut off fmm any other annmcrcial activitia 
that might help them s u p  themelver. 
The circular wuned that those who refused to 
repatriate vohur i ly  md who did not pass the re- 
screming c x u c i r  must i m m c d i i y  leave Djiboutian 
ItTTitOly. T h y  will not receive any arrirlMcc of 
any kind cu oppard to t h a ~  who will recpuriole 
wlrcnlarily. As of January 1, 1987 dl old refuge 
cards, d o n  cuda and asylum &n' atmtatkms 
will not be valid anymore." I h e  circular, signed by 
the M i s t e r  of Interior, c a ~ l u d e d  with the 
following: "In the meanwhile and with immediate 
effect dl programmes of assistance for resettlement to 
third QXlllVies are suspmdcd." 
Several organizations, including the British Rdugee 
Council (BRC), forwarded strong objections to the 
UN High Commissioner for Refugees. Although the 
UNHCR was mpottedly successful in persuading the 
Djibouti government to relent on the issue of 
resculancnt of refugees in a third country, the 
repatriation programme began. 
Is the Repatriation 
Voluntary? 
As in 1982-83, there are contradictory rcporu fran 
Djibouti ccnrrrning the voluntary character of the 
repatriation. h is very difficult to accept assumncu 
now that the conditions under which refugees must 
decide whether or not to repatriate, which include the 
removal of ration cards. are conducive to volun*uy 
repatriation. . Most alarming, as is thc a r e  
everywhere in Africa. not all refugees are registered 
and in Djibouti. those who did not have iden~ification 
cards had no pmtection. and wen removed not as 
refugees but as "illegal immigrants". 
As in 1982-83, over the past few months there have 
been calk for an independent monitoring of the 
npauiation. Given the number of disquieting reponc 
fmn  Djibouti m e  agency did send a staff manber to 
assess the c u m  situation in light of the 
Government of Djibouli's (GoD) circular. A repoct 
was presented to the BRC. As a result of this 
information. a British puliunentPry cornmiace 
proposed to visit Djl'bouti. but rhs Govanmart of 
Djibouti has dedined permission. giving the 
upcoming eieuians u the rason. 
The report (most of which is reproduced here) 
emphasizes the nlucunce of refugees to repatriate. 
pointing out: 
The resurgence of the Ethiopian Peoples' 
Revolutionary Party (EPRP) in the last 
eighteen months and the strength which its 
operations have gained in the rural areas, have 
provoked new levels of intolerance of any kind 
of opposition on the part of the m e .  
Many of the political refugees in Djibouti are 
there because of their own or their relatives' 
involvement with the activities of the EPRP. 
or merely because suspicions have been raised 
against them of such involvement, and the 
reprisals which they thus incurred are still fresh 
in their minds. The UNHCR branch office 
therefore lays itself open to disbelief and 
ridicule when it echoes the GOD'S statements 
that they have nothing to fear from the Dergue 
and a full amnesty awaits them. Refugee con- 
fidence in the UMICR is at an all-time low. 
An increase in the generally xenophobic 
attitude of Djiboutians is easy to detect at the 
moment, and may be at least partly ascribed to 
the forthcoming elections. However, it would 
be a mistake to see the government as a 
monolith with regard to the refugee situation 
since many of its members are not native-born 
Djiboutians but came themselves originally 
from Ethiopia, and many more are related to the 
Issa refugees who make up the majority of the 
Dikhil camp population. From a fmancial as 
well as a political point of view the refugees 
cannot be so easily dismissed: fortunes have 
been made and continue to be made by those 
working for ONARS who handle refugee 
resources and asylum applications. 
The anti-alien atmosphere has recently 
manifested itself in a series of round-ups of 
illegal immigrants in Djibouti town. The 
latest of these resulted on December 29. 1986 
in 125 "argos" from Wollo being ane~ted, 
beaten and loaded into closed metal containes 
on the train and deported By the time the train 
reached the border. six had died of suffocation. 
Although there has been no formal registration 
of asylum seekers since the government's 
circular, some of these deportees may have been 
asylum seekers (ten of them had non-Muslim 
names and were therefore not "argos"), and 
refugees in Djibouti report that one of the dead 
was a registered refugee. It is hoped that the 
UNHCR is now investigating this clakn. 
Whatever the case, GOD is highly embarrassed 
about the publicity given to the incident, which 
has certainly had an adverse effect on the 
repatriation programme. 
Repatriation 
There have so far been three repatriation trains, 
on December 8 and 19. 1986 and January 5. 
1987. A total of just over 1.200 people 
travelled on these trains, and another train was 
scheduled for January 12th. 
The campaign to get people to register for 
repatriation has been left largely in the hands of 
the Commissaire of D i l ,  a man well-known 
for his eccentric and irrational behaviour, and 
the Dikhil ONARS staff. The Commissaire 
has made much use of various harassment 
techniques to convince refugees that they are no 
longer welcome in.  Dilchil: he has driven 
through the camp with a megaphone 
anrtouncing that all refugees must register, and 
that any who do not are in Djibouti illegally; 
he has been seen to slap elderly refugees and 
abuse them; last December there were frequent 
visits by parties of soldiers to the camp in the 
small hours of the morning. opening tents and 
shouting that people must leave, resulting in 
refugees spending the nights in the hills 
surrounding the camp for fear of being forcibly 
deported, ONARS announced that starting 
Dccember 31. 1986 (the deadline mentioned on 
the circular), there would be no more water or 
rations whereupon the water was shut off in the 
camp for three days (rations are in any case two 
months in mean). 
Once registered, refugees do not have the right 
to change their minds. Five families who did 
so were visited by the Commissaire with a 
party of soldiers. who dismantled their aqals 
amidst much verbal abuse, and the 
Cornmissah, hitting anything in range with 
his stick. loaded them and their belongings 
onto a truck. and took them off to catch the 
train. 
Asylum seekers and political refugees have also 
received much "encouragement" to repatriate. 
Several asylum seekers have registered 
voluntarily (fourteen of whom are reported to 
have left the train and headed for Somalia). but 
one man who spoke out against the methods 
being used was forcibly registered and was due 
to be repatriated on January 12th unless the 
UNHCR intervened. Several political refugees 
received papers "convoking" them to appear at 
the repatriation office to register, and when they 
presented themselves and refused to register. 
were told that they should inform the rest of 
their community that they would all have to 
repatriate. 
One fact on which the UNHCR has failed to 
comment, but is commonly noted among the 
refugees, is that over 90% of those who have 
so far repatriated have been Gurgura people 
-- Somali agro-pastoralists. not related to the 
Issas and the Afars, who made up perhaps 35% 
of the Dikhil camp population The two other 
groups of rural refugees, the Issas and the 
Afars, will not be repatriated because they have 
each made deals with the government, the Issas 
being ethnically identical and physically related 
to those in power, and the Afars through the 
intervention of Ali Miah, their Sultan. who 
sent his son &om Jeddah whae he is exiled to 
negotiate with GOD. An alternative 
arrygement has apparently been made by Ali 
Mirrah with the Government of Somalia to 
shelter the Afars, should the need arise. At a 
rough estimate, there are not more than about 
700 Gwgura people left in Dikhil camp, and it 
may therefore be assumed that the repatriation 
is almost over in terms of those who are 
willing to leave. 
Perceptions of Political 
Refugees 
Since it is widely recognized that GOD will not 
force repatriation on either Afar or Issa 
refugees, it is assumed that the current 
campaign must be aimed against political 
refugees. The UNHCR had done nothing to 
dispel thii view, giving no assurance about the 
safety of political refugees or about 
continuation of their status. 
Many refugees have decided in the past six 
months that their situation, in the absence of 
such assurance from the UNHCR, is too vulner- 
able in Djibouti and they have left the territory 
by more or less hazardous routes. Some went 
by boat to Jizan, hoping to get from there to 
the Sudan: it is reported that one of these was 
intercepted by the Ethiopian navy and has been 
taken to Addis. while another fifteen are in 
prison in Jizan. Some left for Somalia on foot, 
and the fate of many others is not known. 
The month of December was a period of real 
terror in Dikhil camp: almost daily visits by 
the Commissaire, announcing that their 
presence is illegal and he can do what he likes 
in Dikhil, summonses to the repatriation office 
compounded by nightly visits by the military 
giving heavy-handed encouragement to the 
campaign. There is no permanent protection 
presence in Dikhil, and thc Protection Officer. 
when asked about the situation during his 
weekly or fortnightly visits. has either refused 
to discuss it with them or has told them that it 
is better for them to repatriate. 
There is much anxiety about the forthcoming re- 
examination of refugee status: the political 
refugees in Djibouti know what they went 
through to get accepted the first time, and dread 
a reenactment of i t  The W R ' s  platitudes. 
along the lines of "if you have a genuine case 
you have nothing to fear" hold ,little comfort 
for those who h o w  that the UNHCR has no 
control over the asylum process. 
Asylum Seekers 
Asylum seekers are those who have entered 
Djibouti with the intention of gaining 
recognition as refugees, but to whom 
recognition has not yet been accorded. They 
theoretically enjoy the same rights of 
protection as do recognized refugees during this 
period. 
It is certainly true that a fairly constant stream 
of asylum seekers has been making its way 
into Djibouti over the past few years, and that 
this flow has bem reduced to a trickle since the 
ending of registration for resettlement in 
February 1986. It must therefore be deduced 
that a strong reason for seeking asylum in 
Djibouti has been, in the past, the lure of 
resettlement. However, this being the case, it 
must also be deduced that those who have 
entered Djibouti since February 1986, and 
especially since July 29, 1986. must have 
extremely good reasons for wanting to leave 
Ethiopia. Yet since the GOD'S circular, the 
decision on who is allowed to enter the territory 
to seek asylum has been lcft to the border 
guards. with no supervision &om UNHCR. 
Those who manage to convince these guards 
that they have a case (which usually involves 
substantial bribes), are then taken to Dikhil 
where there is currently no form of registration 
or issue of identity documents. The asylum 
process has been completely halted for the past 
six months; no rations, tents, or materials of 
any kind have been issued to those arriving 
since July. One meal a day is provided from a 
canteen run by the Protestant Church, and 
asylum seekers have been subject to the same 
"encouragement" to repatriate as other refugees. 
Dikhil has been designated as the place where 
asylum seekers must register. If they more 
outside of Dikhil. asylum seekers are regarded 
as illegal immigrants and are under threat of 
summaty deportation. The UNHCR has stated 
that it can offer no protection of any kind to 
asylum seekers outside of Dikhil. 
Several asylum seekers have repatriated: it is 
assumed that these were people for whom l i e  
in Ethiopia presented a rosier prospect than 
continuing uncertainty in Dikhil. Under 
extremely tough material conditions (rations for 
those arriving before July 1986 consist of onc 
cup of sugar. one cup of oil and 5 kg of rice per 
month). many have decided to risk going to 
Djibouti town in search of other solutions. 
Others chose more radical routes: on January 
8th, four asylum seekers, two new arrivals, and 
two who had been waiting for refugee status for 
more than two years, left D i d  to hly to walk 
to the Sudan across the Danakil desert and 
Eritrea. Desperate measures such as these seem 
to be on the increase. There is little evidence 
to support the High Commissioner's bland 
statement in his letter to the BRC of October 
20th that "asylum will continue to be given to 
new arrivals who meet internationally accepted 
criteria". 
The UNHCR 
The staff of the UNHCR Branch Office in 
Djibouti seems satisfied with the progress of 
the repatriation so far. They admit that some 
of the encouragement given to refugees to 
registcr has been a little heavy-handed but see 
this as being an essential part of the operation. 
They have been pleasantly surprised by the 
flexible attitude demonstrated by the Ethiopian 
government in allowing those repatriated to 
move to wherever they wish. 
The Representative was unconcerned by the fact 
that eligibility to request asylum is being 
decided at the border by illiterate soldiers with 
no knowledge of international conventions: he 
held the view that genuine refugees will always 
find ways to cross. He stressed that no 
protection of any kind can be offered to asylum 
seekers who leave Dikhil, and was dismissive 
of claims that rations issued to them in Dikhil 
were below subsistence level. 
On the question of the need to extend protection 
to genuine political refugees. the Represen- 
tative offered the view that there were very few 
such refugees in Djibouti, and that only the 
Eritreans and Tigreans had a real case. He did 
not consider most Amharas to be genuine 
cases. 
The attitude of the Branch Office staff to 
requcsts by refugees for clarification of thcir 
status can only be described as casual. They 
see no reason to give the refugees any such 
clarification at this stage. Nor do they see the 
need to point out that, despite what the GOD'S 
circular states, refugees have not become illegal 
as of December 31st. They are still hopeful 
that a re-examination of individual refugee 
status will take place within the next few 
